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THE MILITARY TRIAL AT RENNES: 




The Dreyfus affair, known throughout France simply as “the 
affair” (“l’affaire”), caused the downfall of multiple Ministers of 
War, of an administration, and led France to the brink of civil war, as 
well as to a failed coup d’état.1 
The military trial at Rennes, namely Dreyfus’s second mili-
tary trial, which will be the central focus of this essay, was a culmi-
nating point of l’affaire.  It was the last opportunity for the military 
system of justice to redeem itself.  This was because of the incontro-
vertible evidence of Dreyfus’s innocence that existed by the time of 
the second trial.2  The guilt of the true traitor, Esterhazy, had been es-
tablished through a sample of his handwriting, widely disseminated 
in the press, juxtaposed with a facsimile of the bordereau (the trea-
sonous piece of writing by a spy for Germany that had constituted the 
basis of Dreyfus’s arrest and conviction), which also was in Ester-
hazy’s handwriting.3  A document concocted by Colonel Henry, on 
behalf of the army, that had been used in order to ensure that Dreyfus 
 
* Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh.  My sincerest 
thanks to Professor Rodger Citron and Dean Linda Howard Weissman of Touro College 
Law Center for inviting me to address the panel on Dreyfus and the military tribunals from 
which this paper emerged, and for having organized a uniquely valuable and pleasurable in-
tellectual experience.  My thanks also to my co-panelists, General André Bach and Professor 
David Cole, as well as to Professors Michael Marrus and Gary Shaw, who introduced and 
moderated the panel on military tribunals. 
1 See generally JEAN-DENIS BREDIN, THE AFFAIR: THE CASE OF ALFRED DREYFUS (Jeffrey 
Mehlman trans., George Braziller, Inc. 1986) (1983) (discussing “l’affaire”); RUTH HARRIS, 
DREYFUS: POLITICS, EMOTION, AND THE SCANDAL OF THE CENTURY 469-76 (Henry Holt & 
Co., LLC 2010) (2010) (including an excellent chronology of the events of “l’affaire”); 
Jean-Max Guieu, Chronology of the Dreyfus Affair, GEORGETOWN UNIV. (May 2000), 
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/guieuj/DreyfusCase/Chronology%20of%20the%20Dre
yfus%20Affair.htm (including a simple, yet comprehensive, chronology of the events of 
“l’affaire”). 
2 Guieu, supra note 1. 
3 BREDIN, supra note 1, at 224-25. 
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would be convicted later had been revealed to be a forgery.4  By the 
time of the second trial, it also was known that the army had supplied 
a file to the military judges secretly during the course of the first trial, 
without divulging its contents to the defense, in violation of the law.5  
Still other relevant exculpatory information had been disseminated in 
the pro-Dreyfus press.6  The Rennes military trial began with a read-
ing to the court of the report drafted by the Court of Cassation, 
France’s supreme court for criminal matters, which had decided to 
remand the Dreyfus conviction for a second military trial by the 
Council of War (le Conseil de Guerre).7  The Court of Cassation’s 
report was thorough and specific, setting forth the many irregularities 
of the first trial and the grounds for Dreyfus to be innocent.8 
What, then, was the result of Dreyfus’s second trial?  He was 
convicted again, although this time with “attenuating circumstances,” 
and for only ten years.9  A shift had taken place in the dynamic of in-
teraction between the public and the trial with the second Council of 
War.  Firstly, the verdict itself would no longer be unanimous, de-
spite the fact that, just as last time, all of the judges were in the mili-
tary.10  Two out of the seven judges would vote to acquit.11  Second-
ly, the sentence voted by the remaining five would not be carried 
out.12  Indeed, immediately after the verdict, the military court un-
animously asked the government that Dreyfus not be subjected to 
military degradation.13  In this paradoxical gesture by the Rennes tri-
bunal, that just had voted to convict Dreyfus, Jean-Denis Bredin sees 
the first step towards the eventual, and highly controversial, presiden-
 
4 Id. at 225. 
5 Guieu, supra note 1. 
6 BREDIN, supra note 1, at 221-22 (explaining that the press had said so much that it was 
clear that charges would be dropped). 
7 1 LE PROCÉS DREYFUS: DEVANT LE CONSEIL DE GUERRE DE RENNES (7 AOUT – 9 SEPT. 
1899) 2-7 (P.-V Stock ed., 1900). 
8 Id.; see also Guieu, supra note 1 (outlining what led to the Court of Cassation’s decision 
and its effect). 
9 See, e.g., BREDIN, supra note 1, at 427-28 (describing the sentencing); HARRIS, supra 
note 1, at 474 (describing the guilty verdict); Guieu, supra note 1 (stating that Dreyfus was 
found guilty once again). 
10 See BREDIN, supra note 1, at 517, 542-43 (recounting the 5-2 decision). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 545. 
13 Id.  After his initial conviction, Dreyfus had been degraded and sent to Devil’s Island in 
perpetuity.  HARRIS, supra note 1, at 470.  With the reopening of his trial, his rank had been 
restored, which meant that with his subsequent re-conviction; he once again should have 
been subjected to the same degradation. 
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tial pardon of Dreyfus.14  Although the pardon left much to be de-
sired, even that was not the final chapter in the affaire.  In 1906 Drey-
fus finally was fully vindicated when he won a Supreme Court rever-
sal (“cassation”) of the Rennes conviction, and this time it was to be 
without remand (“renvoi”).15 
This conclusion was procedurally exceptional for the French 
Supreme Court of criminal law, for it meant that the Court of Cassa-
tion had decided not only to void the lower court’s decision, but also 
that nothing subsisted which could be “qualified as a crime or a mis-
demeanor.”16  The latter step generally was not undertaken by the 
court which, as its name made clear, habitually quashed (“cassait”) 
lower court decisions, but left them to be substantively retried in fur-
ther, de novo proceedings.17  In Professor Bell’s words, “The normal 
cassation procedure is that the Cour de cassation merely decides the 
disputed question of law and then refers it to a different cour d’appel 
[court of appeals] for a decision on the merits in the light of its rul-
ing.”18  Thus, the Cour de cassation “is not strictly an appeal court, 
but merely a body that quashes the rulings of appeal courts for error 
of law.”19 
The first military tribunal had been able to insist that no hear-
ings be conducted publicly.20  At Rennes, the second military tribunal 
held all hearings publicly, except for one, and the fact that the court 
insisted on holding any at all behind closed doors both exacerbated 
criticism of the proceedings and was hotly contested by the defense, 
for this time the eyes of the country and of the world were fixed on 
 
14 BREDIN, supra note 1, at 545. 
15 Id. at 547. 
16 Id. 
17 JOHN BELL, FRENCH LEGAL CULTURES 29 (Lexis Law Publ’g 2001) (2001).  Unlike in 
the United States, on such remands, courts are not bound to follow the Court of Cassation’s 
reasoning.  See Hervé Rigoli, INSTITUTIONS JUDICIARIES 121 (3d ed. 2001).  Only in recent 
years did the law change to oblige lower courts to conform to Supreme Court rulings on a 
second remand.  Today, after a first remand, where a second lower court echoes the first one, 
disagreeing with the Supreme Court, the Court of Cassation will rehear the case in plenary 
session on appeal, after which a lower court on remand must follow its instructions.  In 
Dreyfus’s time, even that much was not required. 
18 BELL, supra note 17. 
19 Id. 
20 Steven Lubet, Why the Dreyfus Affair Does and Doesn’t Matter, 13 GREEN BAG 2d 329, 
331 (2010) (reviewing LOUIS BEGLEY, WHY THE DREYFUS AFFAIR MATTERS (Yale Univ. 
Press 2009) (“Dreyfus’s attorney asked that the hearing be opened to the public, expecting to 
expose the transparent weakness of the prosecution case, but the military judges denied the 
request.”)). 
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Rennes.21  The world press was ready to convict France if France 
convicted Dreyfus.  And France itself, author of the Rights of Man 
and Citizens,22 country of the philosophes, and of the Enlightenment, 
was only too painfully aware of this.23  After the verdict, not only did 
the international press explode with articles critical of France, but 
there were also demonstrations against France in many countries, in-
cluding Italy, Belgium, Great Britain, and the United States.24  One of 
the Frances that was torn in two by “l’affaire” suffered, while the 
other celebrated Dreyfus’s second conviction.25 
Outside of France, however, a different, philo-French pers-
pective also existed, which can be seen in a description given in the 
recent memoir of Henri Borlant, the only survivor of six thousand 
Jewish children under the age of sixteen who were deported from 
France to Auschwitz in 1942.26  Henri Borlant described his father, 
born in the late nineteenth century in a village near Odessa in what 
today is Ukraine.27  Henri Borlant noted: 
[His father’s] dream [had been] to come to France.  At 
the time, people used to say that a country where half 
the population championed Dreyfus, an obscure Jew-
ish officer, could only be a marvelous country where it 
would be good to live, a country where a Jew could 
become a captain.28 
Just as it captured the imagination and indignation of many 
outside of France, the case of this officer convicted of high treason 
for supplying intelligence to the enemy, and sent to rot on Devil’s 
Island, captivated and destabilized all of France, and in so doing, both 
illuminated cracks that previously had not been apparent and dee-
pened others that had been.29  This hold on the imagination was of a 
symbolic order.  The Dreyfus affair is the story of its own subtext.  
 
21 THE ANNUAL REGISTER: A REVIEW OF PUBLIC EVENTS AT HOME AND ABROAD FOR THE 
YEAR 1899, at 255 (1900). 
22 Rights of Man and Citizens (1789), ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE, http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/histoire/dudh/1789.asp (last visited Dec. 27, 2012).  
23 See, e.g., PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT: THE RISE OF MODERN PAGANISM (reissued 
1995). 
24 BREDIN, supra note 1, at 546. 
25 Id. at 543. 
26 HENRI BORLANT, MERCI D’AVOIR SURVECU 27 (2011). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Lubet, supra note 20, at 332. 
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But not just of one subtext: it is the story of numerous underlying 
subtexts, one of the most important of which was the struggle to de-
fine, or to redefine, the French nation. 
Dreyfus himself, swept up in the arcane mechanisms of penal 
machinery, was focused single-mindedly on reclaiming his innocence 
and honor.30  In his reticence about other issues, those other issues, 
such as political matters, questions of the Enlightenment and human 
rights, floated on a symbolic plane.  They were palimpsests underly-
ing the two trials, or, seen another way, open spaces, in which the 
public became personally invested and engaged.  Consequently, one 
can understand the sense of some who felt that Alfred Dreyfus did 
not measure up to the Dreyfus affair.  On the other hand, to whose af-
fair did he not measure up?  It was their own, rather than his. 
Reproaches have often been leveled against Dreyfus that he 
did not speak out in his own defense, and that he appeared emotion-
less throughout the Rennes trial.31  A review of the transcript of the 
trial compels the opposite conclusion.  Dreyfus spoke at length, and 
always confidently and with impressive specificity and precision, re-
constituting events, showing how and why his accusers could not be 
telling the truth.32  By now he, too, had been obliged to recognize that 
his accusers were guilty of fabrications and inventions, and not just of 
errors.  On numerous occasions throughout the trial, he broke out in 
protest against the injustice and inaccuracy of testimony and, as he 
put it, its calumnious nature.33 
Dreyfus’s own abstention from entering into the struggle to 
define his nation came from the unshakeable faith in France that this 
brilliant man and soldier bore, and that he was to fight for again in 
the First World War.34  Charles de Gaulle would say of himself in his 
memoirs that he always had had “a certain idea of France.”35  Of 
Dreyfus, one can say that he had “an idea certain” of France admit-
ting no doubts.  Dreyfus remained a man of exemplary honor and in-
 
30 ALFRED DREYFUS & L.G. MOREAU, THE LETTERS OF CAPTAIN DREYFUS TO HIS WIFE 112 
(1900). 
31 See BREDIN, supra note 1, at 405-07 (describing the trial generally and the impression 
made by Dreyfus specifically, on others, some of whom were in attendance). 
32 See LE PROCÉS DREYFUS, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 22-45, 654-56, vol. 2, at 231-32, 234-
35, (detailed letter by Dreyfus read into court), 459, 490, 526, 549. 
33 E.g., BREDIN, supra note 1, at 525. 
34 Id. at 619. 
35 CHARLES DE GAULLE, MEMOIRES DE GUERRE - L’APPEL (1940-1942) 7 (Plon, 1954) 
(Pocket 2007). 
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tegrity throughout his ordeal, and the extraordinary suffering he un-
derwent did not seem to make him bitter.36  Along with Jean-Denis 
Bredin, I am prepared to consider Dreyfus a hero, and certainly to 
submit that he fully measured up to l’affaire that bears his name.37 
By the time the Rennes trial took place, proof of his inno-
cence abounded.38  In addition to the evidence noted earlier,39 Colo-
nel Picquart offered impeccable testimony.40  Picquart had discovered 
Dreyfus’s innocence by chance when, as a faithful army man, he had 
believed in the captain’s guilt because Picquart’s superiors had an-
nounced Dreyfus’s guilt as a certainty.41  Picquart, who never had had 
the slightest motivation or inclination to favor Dreyfus, and who per-
sonally had brought the infamous secret file about Dreyfus to the mil-
itary judges during the first trial, offered testimony of Dreyfus’s total 
innocence, and of acts on the army’s part to obtain Dreyfus’s convic-
tion and to hide the truth by dint of conspiracy, lying, and forgery.42  
His testimony was particularly convincing thanks to its high degree 
of thoroughness. 
The so-called graphology, or handwriting expert, who still 
maintained that Dreyfus’s handwriting was the same as that on the 
treasonous note, the borderie, did his best to testify in an ultra-
technical manner, but instead sounded tendentious.43  Another expert 
demolished his testimony swiftly, and with unconcealed contempt 
and indignation.44  The essential fact remained that the complete 
identity between the writing of the real traitor, Esterhazy, and that of 
the borderie did not require any expertise: it was apparent to the 
naked eye. 
In France, there is no quantitative standard in criminal law for 
the defendant’s conviction.45  Whereas in the United States, the stan-
 
36 ALFRED DREYFUS, SOUVENIRS ET CORRESPONDANCE PUBLIES PAR SON FILS (1936). 
37 BREDIN, supra note 1, at 692. 
38 Id. at 224-25. 
39 Supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. 
40 LE PROCÉS DREYFUS, supra note 7, at 368-73, 480-82. 
41 See BREDIN, supra note 1, at 151-52 (discussing how Picquart came to realize the 
handwriting was indicative of Dreyfus’s innocence). 
42 WILLIAM HARDING, DREYFUS: THE PRISONER OF DEVIL’S ISLAND 162-72 (n.p. Asso-
ciated Publ’g Co. 1899). 
43 LE PROCÉS DREYFUS, supra note 7, vol. 2, at 218-21, 318-86.  
44 Id. at 475-85. 
45 See CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] art. 427 (Fr.); Christoph Engel, Prepon-
derance of the Evidence Versus Intimate Conviction: A Behavioral Perspective on a Conflict 
Between American and Continental European Law, 33 VT. L. REV. 435, 435 (2009). 
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss1/4
2012] THE MILITARY TRIAL AT RENNES 11 
dard for conviction is “beyond a reasonable doubt,”46 in France the 
standard is that of the judge’s “intimate conviction.”47  The process 
preceding the trial, known as the instruction, or investigation period, 
functions as a filtering mechanism, such that if the instruction leads 
to a trial, the judge in charge of the instruction believes there is a 
strong probability that the defendant committed the crime.48  Thus, 
unsurprisingly, an overwhelmingly high percentage of criminal trials 
in France result in a conviction.49 
At Rennes, the predisposition of the presiding judge of the 
Council of War was discernible from the start.50  He refused to ac-
knowledge Dreyfus’s military rank, even though the order of the 
Court of Cassation to refer Dreyfus’s case for remand51 had automat-
ically reinstated Dreyfus to his military rank of captain.52  The presid-
ing judge would address Dreyfus brutally: “Stand, accused one!” and 
other forms of abruptness from which
 
it would not have been difficult 
to form an idea of Presiding Judge Jouaust’s “intimate conviction”53 
concerning Dreyfus’s guilt even before the beginning of the proceed-
ings.54  It was only in the final hearing that the presiding judge would 
acknowledge Dreyfus’s rank by referring to him, finally, as “Captain 
Dreyfus.”55  Against all likelihood, Presiding Judge Jouaust, who had 
treated Dreyfus roughly and disrespectfully throughout the trial, was 
persuaded to credit the defense, and was one of the two votes in favor 
of acquittal.56  That act of courage caused him to lose his career, 
however, as the army retired him on January 28, 1900, close on the 
 
46 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
47 Supra note 45 and accompanying text.   
48 CHRISTIAN DADOMO & SUSAN FARRAN, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 192 (1993). 
49 See BELL, supra note 17, at 112 (noting that the acquittal rate for crimes in France was 
4.6% as of 1998).  See generally JACQUELINE HODGSON, FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A 
COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN FRANCE 
(2005) (discussing the French criminal law system). 
50 NICHOLAS HALASZ, CAPTAIN DREYFUS: THE STORY OF A MASS HYSTERIA 222 (1955) 
(“The browbeating attitude of the court’s president, Colonel Jouaust, to Dreyfus and his at-
torneys contrasted grossly with the deference he showed General Mercier and the witnesses 
for the prosecution.”). 
51 See BREDIN, supra note 1, at 405-06 (discussing the harsh nature of questioning of 
Dreyfus by Colonel Jouaust). 
52 See id. at 404 (describing Dreyfus appearing in court in his army uniform). 
53 See supra note 45 and accompanying text (on the French standard for criminal convic-
tion). 
54 LE PROCÉS DE DREYFUS, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 2, 21, vol. 2, at 484. 
55 Id. vol. 2, at 484. 
56 BREDIN, supra note 1, at 428. 
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heels of the trial.57 
The trial proceedings did not stay within the limits of relevant 
issues, as several witnesses were interested in testifying only about 
concerns that touched them personally.  For instance, Casimir-Pèrier, 
who had been President of France at the time of Dreyfus’s arrest, 
seemed either unaware of or unconcerned about the stakes the trial 
involved for Dreyfus, and seemed interested, only principally, in 
drawing the court’s attention to alleged errors that had been published 
recently in a newspaper.58  According to Casimir-Pèrier, an article 
had appeared which portrayed him as having made a promise to 
Dreyfus that he never had made.59  With apparent lack of awareness 
of his own pompousness, he declared himself to be insisting on the 
incident, not out of any selfish motivation, but only because his nu-
merous former illustrious positions on behalf of France required as 
much for the national good: 
It is not the private citizen that is upset [about my situ-
ation]; [but] for the honor of the position of judge that 
I had, for the honor of the Republic, I shall not permit 
it to be said that he who was President of the Republic 
and commander in chief of the army so much as ex-
changed words with a captain accused of treason.60 
The transcript indicates that the audience applauded upon hearing 
this.61  Instead of cutting him off, the presiding judge let him speak 
 
57 Id. at 543. 
58 See LE PROCÉS DE DREYFUS, supra note 7, vol. 1, at 64. 
59 Id. at 60-66. 
60 Id. at 66. 
61 Id.  In France, there were no official, detailed trial transcripts, due to historical reasons 
dating from the time of the French Revolution of keeping open courts.  See HOWARD G. 
BROWN, ENDING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: VIOLENCE, JUSTICE, AND REPRESSION FROM THE 
TERROR TO NAPOLEAN 76, 97 (2006) (discussing how historically, trials were left open to the 
public and relied heavily on oral testimony rather than trial transcripts).  However, private 
newspapers soon after the Revolution were permitted to send their own stenographers.  The 
resulting trial transcripts, composed for newspaper readers, tend to incorporate the reactions 
of the public at every moment in the trial, including, especially, boos, hisses, applause, 
cheers, ironic laughter, etc.  The revolutionaries had introduced into French law what be-
came the “principle of orality” (“le principe de l’oralité”) to end the pre-Revolutionary hid-
den, written orders that could doom a person without a fair trial.  Initially this meant no re-
cording of proceedings.  Orality was supposed also to avoid problems for the many who 
could not read or write.  Within six months, newspapers had received permission to send 
private stenographers to trials of public interest, and they gave a livelier account of all that 
transpired in the courtroom than the United States stenographers’ transcripts, which are li-
mited to the words of the witness.  It was only with a twenty-first century scandal (l’affaire 
8
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his piece. 
Is the army’s perfidy the only explanation of the trial’s out-
come?  What other explanations might there be for Dreyfus’s second 
conviction and for the zeal of the anti-Dreyfus groups?  How can we 
understand, if at all, the lies and deceptions of the army?  It made a 
mistake when it mistook Dreyfus’s handwriting for the one in the 
bordereau, which it resembled somewhat,62 but then it became en-
gulfed in a Machiavellian conspiracy to make the world believe the 
initial error.
 63 
The temptation to lie can prove difficult to resist.  The pres-
sure on prosecutors occasionally can contribute to their allowing or 
presenting false testimony.64 
Anti-Semitism played an important, perhaps even overwhelm-
ing, role in the temptation to lie, but there also were other causes.  
For instance, the French army had been humiliated by the military de-
feat of 1870 and the great suffering that had followed.65  In the con-
text of its own past failures, it is likely the army did not want to be-
tray its failings and mistakes, and especially not have them be 
displayed in public. 
For its part, the country expected from its army eventual re-
venge against Germany, and it needed the army to protect it from at-
tack.  Some of those in the anti-Dreyfus part of the population sought 
to support the army at any price so that it would be as powerful as 
possible and feared weakening it through a public trial of its inepti-
tude.  This motive came from a double, although perhaps related, ori-
gin.  In the first part, France felt, and was, vulnerable, and the anti-
Dreyfusards were hoping through their blind support to situate the 
army as well as possible to protect the country from external attack.  
 
d’Outreau) that reforms in French criminal procedure created a duty to record all proceed-
ings.  See Evelyne Serverin & Sylvie Bruxelles, Restituer l’oral dans la procédure pénale, in 
Enregistrements, procès-verbaux, transcriptions devant la Commission d’enquête: le traite-
ment de l’oral en questions, 55 DROIT ET CULTURES 149-80 (2008). 
62 Guieu, supra note 1. 
63 Id. 
64 See Shaila Dewan, Duke Prosecutor Jailed; Students Seek Settlement, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 8, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/08/us/08duke.html?ref=michaelbnifong 
(describing how prosecutors in the United States sometimes also have become committed to 
hiding the truth, as in the case of the Duke University lacrosse players falsely accused of 
rape, where a number of innocent young men came close to spending a good part of their 
lives behind bars because of an unscrupulous prosecutor). 
65 ROGER L. WILLIAMS, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1870-1871, at 2-3 (Jack P. Greene 
ed., W.W. Norton & Co. Inc. 1969) (1969). 
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In the second part, as Michel Drouin has suggested, a large part of 
France’s population, like Dreyfus himself, held the army in the great-
est admiration, if not in idealization or near-idolatry.66  To them, 
doubting the word of the army seemed unpatriotic. 
Was France’s military justice system less reliable than its civil 
counterpart?  Excepting the hearing behind closed doors, even that is 
not so clear.  It is more than possible that the military judges who 
voted to convict Dreyfus may have followed the wishes of the army 
rather than their “intimate conviction” with respect to the defendant’s 
guilt.  The failure to comply with required criminal procedure in the 
first trial in the affair of the secret file certainly constituted a violation 
of the law.  On the other hand, the role procedure plays is less impor-
tant in countries of civilian (in this context, Continental European, 
codified) law like France than in common-law countries like the 
United States. 
While the distinctions between the two systems in this regard 
are beyond the scope of this essay, it may be said summarily that 
United States law imposes rigid limitations on what may be presented 
during trials and that procedure is inextricably linked to the idea of 
fair play, to such an extent that procedural fairness is a matter of con-
stitutional law.67  In France, substantive truth, and the search for the 
truth, takes primacy.68  Therefore, the idea that the court may have 
obtained access to evidence through irregular means, in violation of 
what procedural law had in mind, is less shocking to the French legal 
spirit than its American counterpart, at least if the information is of 
assistance in the universal objective of understanding the truth.  This 
was still truer in the nineteenth century than today. 
Thus, Colonel Picquart who would be ready to sacrifice his 
career and liberty for Dreyfus, a man he barely knew, had not hesi-
tated to transmit the secret file to the judges in the first military trial 
as long as he did not suspect his army colleagues of having fabricated 
evidence against an innocent man.69  Similarly, an attempt to insert a 
secret file into the closed hearing at the Rennes trial did not succeed, 
but nevertheless was not evaluated as being a particularly serious vi-
 
66 Michel Drouin, Political and Religious Forces (author’s notes from Drouin lecture at 
Touro Dreyfus conference). 
67 E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
68 Martin A. Rogoff, A Comparison of Constitutionalism In France and the United States, 
49 ME. L. REV. 21, 53 (1997). 
69 BREDIN, supra note 1, at 155 (discussing the low priority of procedural requirements to 
the French sense of justice). 
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olation in the eyes of the tribunal. 
When one considers the conduct of the Court of Cassation, 
namely, of non-military justice, it also must be conceded that the rea-
son Dreyfus had to wait many years for his vindication was that the 
Court of Cassation obeyed another master, namely the government.70  
In both institutions, military as well as civilian, there were also some 
exceptional individuals prepared to fight for the truth at any cost. 
In ending this essay, I would like to disclose my own Dreyfus 
affair, the subtext that I read between the lines of this riveting story.  
It is that society’s institutions, whether juridical or not, depend on 
those individuals, those human beings, who inhabit them, who people 




70 Id. at 595 (showing that even after the innumerable tergiversations that caused Dreyfus 
to have to wait until 1905, he was to have to wait yet a bit longer for the Court of Cassation 
to render its judgment of vindication, because, as Bredin puts it, everyone thought it better to 
wait for the general elections to be over beforehand). 
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